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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3-(2)(j).
GOVERNING LAW
The following statutory provisions are relevant to this litigation: Utah Code Ann.
§§78-12-25; 78-12-26.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs in this appeal are Lawrence M. Russell ("Russell") and Russell/Packard
Development Inc. ("Russell/Packard"), Russell's real estate development company
(together, the "Russell Plaintiffs"). [R. 72 at % 1; R. 73 at % 2.] Defendant John Thomas
("Thomas") was Russell's sole partner in a Utah limited liability company known as PRP
Development, L.C. ("PRP"), which was in the business of buying and selling residential
lots for development. [R. 74 at % 8; R. 75 atffif15, 18.] On November 4, 1996, an entity
known as CMT, Inc. ("CMT") entered into a contract to purchase 72 undeveloped twin
home lots located in Saratoga Springs, Utah County (the "Saratoga property") from
Saratoga Springs Development Company, L.L.C. ("Saratoga") for $25,000 per lot. This
contract is referred to hereafter as the "Saratoga-CMT transaction." [R. 75 at If 20; R. 77
at T} 33; R. 79 at f 42.] Neither CMT nor Saratoga is a party to these proceedings.
On November 8, 1996, PRP, the real estate development entity owned by Plaintiff
Russell and Defendant Thomas, signed a real estate contract to purchase the Saratoga
property from CMT. [R. 79 at f 45.] PRP agreed to pay $30,000 per lot for the Saratoga
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property. [R. 79 atffi[44-45.]
In April of 1997, Russell and Thomas had a falling out and, in an effort to wind up
the affairs of PRP, they entered into a contract through which, among other things, PRP's
contract to purchase the Saratoga property from CMT, for $30,000 per lot, was assigned
to Russell. Russell's assigned right to purchase the lots from CMT is referred to hereafter
as the UCMT-Russell transaction." [R. 68.] Thereafter, in a series of recorded real estate
closings, commencing on July 1, 1997, Saratoga conveyed the Saratoga property to CMT,
which in turn conveyed the property to Plaintiff Russell (as PRP's assignee) for the price
specified in the real estate purchase contract between PRP and CMT. [R. 43-48.]
Although the transactions proceeded smoothly according to the contractual terms,
the Russell Plaintiffs now seek damages for fraud. According to Plaintiffs, at the time
Saratoga agreed to sell the lots to CMT, Saratoga was under the mistaken belief that it
was actually selling the lots to PRP. [R. 81 at Tf 58.] Thus, the Russell Plaintiffs, despite
receiving exactly what they bargained for (i.e., the purchase of the Saratoga property from
CMT for $30,000 per lot),filedthis lawsuit in the fall of 2001. [R. 1-18.] Plaintiffs'
argument, apparently, is that they are entitled to damages arising out of the CMT-Russell
transaction because of fraud as to the identity of the buyer in the Saratoga-CMT
transaction.
The essence of Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint is that because Saratoga was
allegedly mistaken about the identity of the buyer of the Saratoga property in the
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transaction between Saratoga and CMT, fraud was committed on the Russell Plaintiffs in
the transaction between CMT and Russell. Eight causes of action are alleged: (1) breach
of fiduciary duty, (2) civil conspiracy, (3) unjust enrichment, (4) conversion and
misappropriation, (5) breach of principal-agency relationship, (6) intentional interference
with prospective economic relations, (7) commercial bribery, and (8) fraud. [R. 72-90.]
As set forth more fully herein, seven of the eight claims (all but the claim for commercial
bribery), are barred by the statute of limitations, the first six by Plaintiffs' own admission.
Moreover, the seventh and eight claims fail for other reasons: commercial bribery because
there is no private right of action; and fraud because the essence of the Russell Plaintiffs'
Complaint is that Saratoga, an entity which is not a party to this litigation, was defrauded.
This Court should affirm the trial court's order dismissing the Complaint and Amended
Complaint with prejudice.1 [R. 191-194.]

1

Plaintiffs complain, somewhat tangentially, about the fact that the trial court
considered documents outside of the scope of the pleadings "for which there was no
foundation and which are inappropriate on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss." [See, Brief of
Appellant at p. 21.] The only documents considered, however, were those specifically
referenced in the Amended Complaint, and the court may consider documents attached as
exhibits or incorporated by reference in the pleadings when deciding a motion to dismiss.
2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 3d § 12.34[2] (3d ed. 2002)
("In deciding whether to dismiss, the court may consider... documents... incorporated
by reference in the pleadings. ...") Furthermore, Plaintiffs waived any such objection
when they conceded at oral argument that they "didn't care about the [Court's
examination of the contractual documents] because they are what they are." [R. 207 at
p.37.]
579797v1
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS2
1.

Russell/Packard is a real estate development corporation engaged in the

development and construction of residential homes. [R. 72 at U 1.] Russell and Thomas
were partners in PRP, a Utah limited liability company. [R. 75 at 1J18.] Thomas was the
manager of PRP. [R. 73 at ^j 5.]
2.

Carson and Bustos were real estate agents for Wardley Better Homes and

Gardens. [R. 74 at ^ 10.] In the summer of 1996, Carson showed Thomas (who was
acting for PRP), 72 lots for sale, located in the city of Saratoga Springs, Utah County. [R.
76 at 1f 26.]
3.

PRP made an offer to purchase the Saratoga property, but not until after

CMT, an entity which Plaintiffs allege was a sham, had contracted to purchase the lots
from Saratoga for $25,000 per lot (the "Saratoga-CMT transaction"). [R. 77 at % 33; R.
80 at U 50.]
4.

On November 8, 1996, CMT resold the lots it had purchased from Saratoga

to PRP, at a price of $30,000 per lot. [R. 79 at 1fl[ 44,45.] This real estate purchase
contract was entered into by and between CMT and PRP. [Id.]
5.

On or about April 1997, problems arose between Russell and Thomas, and

in an effort to separate their business interests, Russell was assigned PRP's contract to

2

The relevant facts are based on Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint as the Court
of Appeals must accept the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint as true. E.g.,
Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991).
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purchase the Saratoga property from CMT for $30,000 (the "CMT-Russell transaction").
[R. 68; 39-42].
6.

In a series of closings commencing on or about July 1, 1997, Saratoga

conveyed the Saratoga property to CMT, and CMT conveyed it to Plaintiff Russell. [R.
43-45.]
7.

CMT had no relationship to Saratoga or PRP. [R, 80 at ^ 52.] However,

Plaintiffs have alleged that "Defendants represented to Saratoga that CMT was part of,
affiliated with, or owned by plaintiffs." [R. 82 at ^f 65 (emphasis added).] Plaintiffs have
further alleged that "Believing CMT was part of, affiliated with, or owned by PRP,
Saratoga sold the lots to CMT for $25,000
8.

" [R. 82 at f 68 (emphasis added).]

Plaintiffs believed that CMT was the agent, under the control of, owned by,

or was otherwise acting for Saratoga until the spring of 2000. [R. 81 at ^ 55.] Plaintiffs
aver in their Amended Complaint, Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, and at
oral argument that the alleged fraud was discovered in the spring of 2000. [Id.; R. 68; R.
207 at p.32 (emphasis added).]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's complete dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint and Amended
Complaint should be affirmed on four bases. First, Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the
applicable statutes of limitations. Second, the Russell Plaintiffs lack standing to assert a
claim for fraud allegedly committed in the Saratoga-CMT transaction, as opposed to the
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CMT-Russell transaction. Third, the fraud claim fails on its merits. Finally, there is no
private cause of action for commercial bribery.
ARGUMENT
I.

ALL OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS.
Six of the Russell Plaintiffs' claims were subject to a four year statute of

limitations: breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, conversion and
misappropriation, breach of principal-agency relationship and intentional interference
with prospective economic relations (together, the "four-year claims")- Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-25. The two remaining causes of actions, commercial bribery and fraud
(together, the "three-year claims"), were subject to a three year statute of limitations.
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26.
Plaintiffs have argued that by application of the discovery rule, the running of the
statute of limitations on each cause of action was tolled until the Spring of 2000. [See,
Brief of Appellant at p. 13.] As set forth below, however, the discovery rule is not
applicable; and even if it was, it does not save Plaintiffs' claims from the statutes of
limitations.
A.

The Four-Year Claims are Time-Barred.

Plaintiffs acknowledge that because the real estate purchase contract between PRP
and CMT was executed on November 8, 1996, that "absent tolling by the discovery rule,
the statute of limitations expired on the commercial bribery and fraud claims on
579797v1
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November 7, 1999 and on the remaining four-year claims on November 7, 2000." [See,
Brief of Appellants at p. 13.]
Plaintiffs have alleged, however, that "in the spring of 2000 (roughly six months
before the statute of limitations was to expire on the four-year claims), an accountant for
Saratoga questioned the ownership or control status of CMT.. . [and] plaintiffs were first
placed on inquiry notice of CMT's control status as well." [R. 81 atfflf57, 58.] At this
point, according to Plaintiffs' pleading, they knew - contrary to what they allege they
previously believed to be the case - that CMT was a completely distinct entity from
Saratoga. As Plaintiffs' counsel put the matter during oral argument:
We have alleged that we have a fraud in 1996, and we have alleged that we
didn't discover it in 2000 until the final take down of the last twelve lots
where someone in Saratoga's organization is going through the
paperwork - and we plead this.
[R. 207 at p. 32.]
The Russell Plaintiffs thus admit that the facts supporting their claim were
discovered in the Spring of 2000, at least six months before the statute of limitations ran
on any of the four-year claims. Consequently, the discovery rule does not apply. The
Utah Supreme Court has held that the discovery rule does not apply "to a plaintiff who
becomes aware of his injuries or damages and a possible cause of action before the statute
of limitations expires." Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 823 P.2d 1064, 1065 (Utah 1992)
(citing Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Constr. Co., 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987)). There
is, thus, no basis for tolling the statute of limitations with respect to the four-year claims.
579797v1
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As a consequence, the statute expired on November 7, 2000. The Complaint was not
filed until November 30, 2001.
It should be noted that in an effort to avoid the clear application of the relevant
statutes of limitations, the Russell Plaintiffs have repeatedly played games with the statute
of limitations analysis. In the proceedings below, they acknowledged that they first
learned of the alleged problems with the transaction in the Spring of 2000. [R. 81 at Tf 55,
R. 207 at p. 32] When the Defendants then pointed out that the discovery on this date
would mean that the statute of limitations had expired on their causes of action, and
prevailed on this point, the Russell Plaintiffs realized that they had to come up with a
better story.
So now Plaintiffs argue, for the first time on this appeal, that while they knew in
the Spring of 2000 that there had been a fraud, "they did not discover actual facts forming
the basis for their causes of action until after the November 7, 2001 deadline." [See,
Brief of Appellant at p. 17.] However, Plaintiffs have not made this assertion before and
cannot make new arguments or present new theories on appeal. See, LeBaron & Assoc, v.
Rebel Enters., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (when no supporting evidence or
relevant legal authority is introduced at trial in support of the claim, the issue has not been
preserved for appeal); see also, Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994)
("we will review the issues raised for the first time on appeal only if exceptional
circumstances exist"). Moreover, even if this argument had been made below, under the
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Atwood case cited above, Plaintiffs' discovery of the alleged fraud in the Spring of 2000
rendered the discovery rule inapplicable, since the discovery rule does not apply "to a
plaintiff who becomes aware of his injuries or damages and a possible cause of action
before the statute of limitations expires." Atwood, 823 P.2d at 1065.3
B.

The Three-Year Claims are Time-Barred.

With respect to the two remaining causes of action, commercial bribery and fraud,
both claims fail on the merits (see, Sections II, III and IV below). Furthermore,
Plaintiffs' fraud claim was required to be brought within three years of the date on which
the facts constituting fraud were, or reasonably should have been, discovered. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-26 (3). The Utah Supreme Court has explained the fraud statute of
limitations as follows:
The words 'until the discovery [of fraud]' are generally
interpreted as meaning from the time the fraud was actually
known or could have been discovered through the exercise of
reasonable diligence. . . . A party who has the opportunity of
knowing the facts constituting the alleged fraud cannot be
inactive and afterwards allege a want of knowledge that arose
by reason of his own laches and negligence.

3

Furthermore, this Court should not adopt a policy which allows plaintiffs to plead
that the statute of limitations ran before discovery of the underlying facts, thus
implicating the discovery rule, and then take as much time as they need - in this case 1 Vi
years - to file their claims. This would make the limitations period indeterminate. E.g.,
Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 52 (Utah 1996) (policy underlying statute of
limitations is to "promote justice by preventing surprises through revival of claims that
have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and
witnesses have disappeared") (citations omitted).
579797v1
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Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1196 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added; citations omitted).
Thus, in determining when the statute of limitations began to run on Plaintiffs'
fraud claim, this Court must decide at what point the alleged fraud was known or could
have reasonably been discovered. Applying this standard, Plaintiffs' position that they
were unaware of CMT's role in the transactions is untenable. CMT is named in each real
estate purchase contract and each deed conveying the Saratoga property, putting the
Russell Plaintiffs on inquiry notice of CMT's role as early as November 1996. [R. 79 at
ffi[ 44, 45.] CMT is also named in the assignment from PRP to Plaintiff Russell that was
executed in April 1997. Finally, in a series of real estate closings beginning in July 1997
the Saratoga lots were conveyed twice - first from Saratoga to CMT and then from CMT
to Plaintiffs. [R. 43-48.] Thus, the contracts, assignments and deeds documenting the
real estate transactions were sufficiently clear to have put the Russell Plaintiffs on inquiry
notice which, if followed, would have resulted in a discovery of the underlying facts now
forming the basis for their claims as early as November 1996. [R. 79 atffif44, 45; R. 4345.] See also, United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 889
(Utah 1993) (a proxy statement disclosing the very facts upon which allegations arose
was sufficient to put shareholders on notice that they needed to inquire further).
The Russell Plaintiffs' second argument, however, is that the mere naming of
CMT in the documents was not sufficient to put them on inquiry notice because the
Defendants acted to "fraudulently conceal" CMT's identity from them. [See, Brief of
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Appellant at p. 18-19.] In determining whether the statute of limitations should be tolled
due to fraudulent concealment, this court must determine:
(i) when a plaintiff would reasonably be on notice to inquire
into a defendant's bad acts despite defendant's attempts to
hide those acts; and (ii) whether a plaintiff, once on notice,
reasonably would have discovered, with due diligence, the
facts on which the cause of action is based despite
defendant's efforts to hide those facts.
Hill v. Alfred, 28 P.3d 1271, 1276 (Utah 2001) (citing Berenda, 914 P.2d at 52).
First, as discussed above the Russell Plaintiffs would reasonably be on notice to
inquire into CMT's role in the real estate transactions as early as November 1996, and at
least by April or July of 1997 when the documents bearing the name CMT were provided
to the Russell Plaintiffs. With respect to concealing CMT's identity, Plaintiffs only
vaguely assert that the Defendants failed to affirmatively explain the nature of CMT's
role in the transaction. [R. 80 at ^j 54.] This allegation, however, is insufficient as a
matter of law to constitute fraudulent concealment. See, Berenda, 914 P.2d at 54 (when
the "facts underlying the allegation of fraudulent concealment are so tenuous, vague or
insufficiently established that they fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
concealment" the claim should fail as a matter of law). Thus, the Russell Plaintiffs were
on inquiry notice by July of 1997, at the latest.
Second, this Court must determine whether the Russell Plaintiffs, once on notice,
reasonably would have discovered, with due diligence, the facts on which the cause of
action is based despite defendant's efforts to hide those facts. The Russell Plaintiffs did
579797v1
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nothing until the Spring of 2000, and even then did not complete their investigation of the
facts on which the cause of action was based until November 7, 2001. [See, Brief of
Appellant at p. 17.] The equitable maxim that "the means of knowledge is equivalent to
knowledge" should be applied. Berenda, 914 P.2d at 52; see also, Baldwin, 850 P.2d at
1197 (refusing to toll the statute based on fraudulent concealment where the deed
effecting the purported fraudulent conveyance had not been concealed, and therefore "the
means of knowledge" was available to the creditors). All that was required of the Russell
Plaintiffs was a telephone call to Saratoga, or even CMT, inquiring about the respective
roles of the parties identified in the transaction. This Court should not allow the Russell
Plaintiffs to bring a cause of action for fraud five years after the purported problems with
the transaction (i.e., the involvement of CMT) was clear, wrhen a reasonable person would
have taken a few simple steps to discover the facts on which the fraud claim is based.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS' FRAUD
CLAIM FOR LACK OF STANDING.
Apart from to the statute of limitations, the trial court's ruling that the Russell

Plaintiffs lack standing to bring a fraud claim should be affirmed on three separate,
independently sufficient grounds: (1) the parties' intention not to assign the Russell
Plaintiffs anything other than the purchase right is clear on the face of the assignment;
(2) personal causes of action, such as fraud, are not assignable; and (3) in any event, the
purported fraud alleged by the Russell Plaintiffs arose out of a transaction to which they
were not even a party - between Saratoga and CMT.
579797v 1
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First, no cause of action was assigned. Instead, the assignment specifically
provides:
PRP agrees to assign to Russell all of its right, title and interest in the
Contract (signed by PRP as Buyer on November 5, 1996 and signed by
CMT as Seller on November 8, 1996) and its right to acquire the Saratoga
Property at the time of closing.
[See, Addendum to Brief of Appellees Carson and Bustos at p. 15 ("Addendum"); R. at
39-42.] Plaintiff Russell received the fruits of the contract. He acquired the right to
purchase the Saratoga propeity from CMT for precisely the amount of money PRP agreed
to pay. Other than the right to acquire the Saratoga property for the agreed upon price,
the assignment to Russell expressly excluded any further rights:
Russell and RPI acknowledge and agree that upon the consummation of the
transaction set forth in this Agreement, neither Russell nor RPI shall have
any further interest in and to PRP or any of its assets, projects or properties.
[See, Addendum at p. 16; R. 40.] In other words, PRP specifically reserved any other
"assets" not specifically identified in the transaction - including its causes of action, if
any, arising out of the Contract. In considering whether assignees have standing to bring
particular claims, courts "determine exactly what has been assigned to make certain that
the plaintiff is the real party in interest with regard to the particular claim involved in the

action." C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1545 (1971).
In this case, it is clear from the face of the assignment that other than the right to purchase
the Saratoga property, no other "asset" of PRP, including its causes of action, if any, were
part of the assignment.
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Second, even if this Court were to determine that causes of action generally were
assigned to Plaintiff Russell by the terms of the agreement, fraud claims are personal in
nature and therefore should not be included:
Unless a contrary intention is manifest or inferable, an assignment
ordinarily carries with it all rights, remedies and benefits which are
incidental to the thing assigned, except as those which are personal to the
assignor and for his benefit.
WAMCO, III v. First Piedmont Mortgage Corp., 856 F. Supp."1076, 1086 (E.D. Va.
1994) (citing 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 76). Courts routinely hold that this principle
precludes assignments of purely personal causes of action, such as claims for fraud. See
id.; see also, Huston v. Ohio & Colorado Smelting & Refining Co., 165 P. 251 (Colo.
1917) (claim for fraud by purchaser of stock was not assigned when original purchaser
sold that stock); Schwartz v. Durham, 80 P.2d 453 (Ariz. 1938) ("right of action growing
out of fraud is usually a personal right to the extent that it does not pass with an
assignment of the thing to which the right relates") (citations omitted). Thus, because the
Russell Plaintiffs are attempting to bring a fraud claim - which is personal in nature and
was not specifically included in the assignment, they lack standing to assert this cause of
action.
Third, and perhaps most important, it bears repeating that the conduct about which
the Russell Plaintiffs are complaining allegedly occurred in a transaction to which
Plaintiff Russell's assignor, PRP, was not even a party - the Saratoga-CMT transaction.
[R. 82 atffif65, 68.] The Russell Plaintiffs are not Saratoga themselves, nor assignees of
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Saratoga. Because the Russell Plaintiffs' claims fundamentally derive from their effort to
assert the rights of an unrelated third party, there can be no standing as a matter of law.
Because the right to bring a cause of action with respect to the underlying real
estate transactions was not assigned; and because even if it was, the Russell Plaintiffs
were in no event assigned the right to bring a claim for fraud arising out of the SaratogaCMT transaction, they have no standing to assert a claim for fraud.
III.

PLAINTIFFS' FRAUD CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW,
In addition to the statute of limitations and the lack of standing, Plaintiffs fraud

claims fail as a matter of law for at least five reasons: (1) the alleged misrepresentations
are immaterial to the transaction; (2) the alleged misrepresentations were not made to the
Russell Plaintiffs, or with the intent to induce the Russell Plaintiffs to take any action;
(3) the alleged misrepresentations were not revealed prior to the time the Russell
Plaintiffs consummated the transaction and therefore were not misrepresentations upon
which they could have reasonably relied; (4) the alleged misrepresentations were,
according to the Russell Plaintiffs, made by Thomas (a manager of PRP) to PRP, and a
party cannot commit fraud on itself; and (5) Plaintiffs suffered no damages because they
received exactly what they bargained to receive.4

4

While additional arguments are included in this Section, the Court of Appeals
may affirm the decision on any legal ground or theory apparent from the record, even
though such ground or theory was not raised in the lower court. Bailey v. Baylest 52 P.3d
1158, 1161 (Utah 2002).
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First, the alleged misrepresentation identified by Plaintiffs - that Saratoga did not
know the true identity of the buyer - is immaterial.5 The misrepresentation allegedly
made to Saratoga - concerning the identity of the buyer - was immaterial to the
transaction. "The identity of the other party to the transaction is material if the
transaction would not have been consummated had the seller known who the buyer was,
and if the latter either knew, or had good reason to know, of the seller's disposition
against him." 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 48 (2001). In this case, the Russell
Plaintiffs fail even to allege that the identity of the buyer was material to Saratoga, or that
Saratoga would have refused to accept $1,800,000 for the properties - if only Saratoga
had known the money came from CMT.
Second, the Russell Plaintiffs correctly point out that for a material
misrepresentation to constitute fraud, it must be made for the purpose of inducing
plaintiffs to act, and plaintiffs must rely on it to their detriment. Pace v. Parrish, 247
P.2d 273 (Utah 1952); see also, Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 301 (Utah 1978)
(plaintiff must "prove the defendant knowingly misrepresented a material fact with intent

5

The Russell Plaintiffs set forth the purported misrepresentations as follows:
"Carson and Thomas further led Saratoga to believe PRP was purchasing the Saratoga
lots directly from Saratoga by presenting to Saratoga, through Thomas' connection with
PRP, PRP's proprietary plans and drawing for the development and construction of the
Saratoga Lots." [See, Brief of Appellant at p. 6 (emphasis added).] They further state:
"Believing CMT was affiliated with or a part of PRP, based on the representations by the
Carson Defendants, Saratoga agreed to sell the Saratoga Lots to CMT." [See, Brief of
Appellant at p. 7 (emphasis added).]
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to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from action"); King v. Nevada Elec. Inv. Co., 893
F. Supp. 1006, 1012 (D. Utah 1993) (without proof of any affirmative, material
misrepresentation by defendant to plaintiff, no fraud claim will lie). The Russell
plaintiffs, however, have not alleged any misrepresentation was made by any of the
Defendants to them. Instead, they allege that Defendants falsely misrepresented to
Saratoga that CMT was "affiliated with, owned by, or part of plaintiffs." [R. 78 at f 38.]
The Russell Plaintiffs further allege that they "reasonably believed" that CMT was
"affiliated with, owned by, or was a part of Saratoga, which it was not." [Id. at f 37.]
However, nowhere do they allege that Defendants ever made such representations to them
or with the intent to cause them to act or refrain from action.6 Without proof of a
misrepresentation intended to make Plaintiffs act, or refrain from acting, there can be no
claim for fraud.
Third, in an apparent (although misguided) effort to save their claims from being
time-barred, the Russell Plaintiffs contend that they did not even learn of the alleged
misrepresentation to Saratoga until the Spring of 2000, nearly three and a half years after
the contract with CMT was executed. Plaintiffs therefore could not possibly have relied
on any such misrepresentation in November of 1996. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot meet the

6

By the time the trial court entered its order of dismissal, the Plaintiffs had
already amended their complaint once, and they did not ask for another opportunity to do
so in connection with the hearing on Defendants' motion to dismiss. Presumably the
fraud claim was by then pleaded as well as it could be pleaded.
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threshold requirement of showing that they relied to their detriment upon any
misrepresentations by the Defendants. See, Robinson v. Tripco Inv. Inc., 21 P.3d 219,
224 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (plaintiff must prove that he or she "acting reasonably and in
ignorance of the statement's falsity, did in fact rely upon the misrepresentation.")
(quotation omitted).
Fourth, the Russell Plaintiffs' fraud claim is premised entirely upon their rights as
an assignee of PRP's right, title and interest in the Saratoga property.7 Yet, Plaintiffs do
not argue that PRP took any action in reliance on misrepresentations made by Thomas,
nor could they, because PRP consisted only of Thomas and Russell. [R. 73 at TJ 5.] A
party cannot commit fraud upon itself. Since Thomas allegedly knew of the Defendants'
"scheme," he cannot have relied upon misrepresentations he either made or knew were
false. Furthermore, as a matter of law, both Russell and PRP were charged with the
knowledge that Thomas had, which included the knowledge that CMT and Saratoga were
not the same entity, and that the sale price from Saratoga to CMT was $25,000 per lot.
[R. 78 atffl|37, 38.] See e.g., United Park City Mines Co., 870 P.2d at 886 (if one
director knew facts which by the exercise of due diligence could have led to the discovery
of alleged wrongdoing, that director's knowledge is imputed to the corporation) (citing
Interlake Porsche & Audi, Inc., v. Bucholz, 728 P.2d 597, 607 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986)).

7

"It is the purchase of [the Saratoga Lots] and the representations, acts and
omissions associated with it which form the basis of the Russell Plaintiffs' claims against
the Carson Defendants." [See, Brief of Appellant at p.21.]
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Finally, the Russell Plaintiffs cannot prove damages on their fraud claim. To
prove fraud on a contract, a plaintiff must show that he did not receive the benefit of his
bargain. It is not, however, "for the jury to make a new contract for the parties or fix a
new price on plaintiffs property." Hecht v. Metzler, 48 P. 37 (Utah 1897) (citing Drew v.
Beall, 62 111. 164 (111. 1871)). Utah follows the majority rule, which provides that
damages in a fraud case are based on the difference between the actual value of what was
received and the value thereof if it had been as represented. Dilworth v. Lauritzen, 424
P.2d 136, 138 (Utah 1967). Here, Plaintiff Russell got exactly that for which he
bargained. PRP executed a real estate contract agreeing to pay $30,000 per lot to CMT
for the Saratoga property. PRP assigned its purchase rights to Plaintiff Russell, who did
pay $30,000 per lot to CMT and received precisely the parcels for which he paid. Only
when a party to a contract fails to receive what was represented, can there be any claim
for fraud.
In sum, the Russell Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any fraud. The purported
misrepresentations are wholly immaterial to the underlying transactions. Moreover,
Plaintiffs do not allege that a misrepresentation was made to them, but to Saratoga. They
further contend that they were not aware of the misrepresentations until three and half
years after they claim to have relied upon them. In addition, their fraud allegation is
premised entirely upon their assignment of PRP's rights, and there can be no claim that
the principal of PRP (Thomas) defrauded PRP. Finally, since Plaintiffs got exactly what
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they bargained for - 72 lots for $30,000 per lot - they suffered no damages.
For the foregoing reasons the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' fraud claims
should be affirmed.
IV.

PLAINTIFFS' COMMERCIAL BRIBERY CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER
OF LAW.
Plaintiffs' claims of commercial bribery pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-508

also must fail as a matter of law because the penal code provides no private right of
action. Plaintiffs' claim is based on Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-508, a penal statute making it
a class A misdemeanor to engage in commercial bribery. Specifically, the statute
provides as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor when,
without the consent of the employer or principal, contrary to
the interests of the employer or principal:
(a) he confers, offers, or agrees to confer upon the
employee, agent, or fiduciary of an employer or
principal any benefit with the purpose of
influencing the conduct of the employee, agent, or
fiduciary in relating to his employer's or
principal's affairs; or
(b) he, as an employee, agent, or fiduciary of an
employer or principal, solicits, accepts, or agrees
to accept any benefit from another upon an
agreement or understanding that such benefit will
influence his conduct in relation to his employer's
or principal's affairs; provided that this section
does not apply to inducements made or accepted
solely for the purpose of causing a change in
employment by an employee, agent, or fiduciary.
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(2) A person is guilty of a violation of this section if he holds
himself out to the public as being engaged in the business of
making disinterested selection, appraisal, or criticism of
goods or services and he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept
any benefit to influence his selection, appraisal, or criticism.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-508.
Notably, the statute does not provide for any private right of action based on the
proscribed conduct. As set forth below, under Utah law a cause of action will not be
implied where the Legislature has not provided for one. Thus, there is no private right of
action for commercial bribery under Utah law, and the dismissal of Plaintiffs5 Fourth
Cause of Action should be affirmed.
A.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-508 Does Not Expressly Provide a Private Right
of Action for Violation of the Statute.

Section 76-6-508 does not provide for a private right of action. Instead, it simply
states that the proscribed conduct constitutes a class A misdemeanor. It is axiomatic
under Utah law that "statutes are to be construed according to their plain language."
Cannon v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 994 P.2d 824, p22 (Utah App. 2000) (quoting Arndt
v. First Interstate Bank, 991 P.2d 584 (Utah 1999)). See alsoy O'Keefe v. Utah State
Retirement Bd., 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998). Courts "do not look beyond the plain
language unless [they] find ambiguity." Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d
257, 259 (Utah 1998). Applying these well-established canons of statutory construction,
it is plain that no private right of action is provided for in § 76-6-508.
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B.

Utah Courts Do Not Imply a Private Right of Action Where None Is
Provided by the Express Terms of the Statute.

Under Utah law, a private right of action is not implied. In Broadbent v. Board of
Education, 910 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah App. 1996), the court rejected the plaintiffs
attempt to assert a private cause of action on the basis of a statute that did not clearly
provide for it. The Broadbent court explained that "[w]hile there is a considerable body
of law involving the creation of private rights of action under federal law, the courts of
this state are not generally in the habit of implying a private right of action based upon
state law, absent some specific direction from the Legislature." Id. (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974), the Utah
Supreme Court held that where a criminal statute relied upon by the plaintiff provided no
private right of action, the matter was best left to the Legislature. The Court therefore
declined to fashion a private remedy. See also, J.H. by D.H. v. West Valley City, 840
P.2d 115, 125 (Utah 1992) (declining to create a private right of action for failure to
challenge city's failure to follow hiring procedures required by state statute).
The foregoing authority plainly illustrates the futility of Plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of
Action. There is no private right of action for commercial bribery under Utah law, and
the law does not imply one.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint and
First Amended Complaint should be affirmed.
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